Is Decentralisation in Andhra Pradesh Achieving Equitable Ends?

Purendra Prasad

Vamsi Vakulabharanam

 

At a time when there is rise of centralisation and dilution of federalism under the BJP-led union government against the spirit of democracy and people’s interests, Andhra Pradesh (AP) state government decided to move towards decentralisation within the state since 2019.

YSRCP government took three major initiatives in this direction.

First, in August 2019, it introduced grama/ward sachivalayams for rural/urban areas to ensure effective delivery of government services and schemes without scope for middlemen or corruption.  After a year, Rythu Bharosa Kendralu (RBKs) were introduced in each village to sell seeds, fertilisers, pesticides as well as to assist in soil testing and selling their final produce. Each RBK has a digital kiosk where farmers could place orders for inputs that are delivered at their doorstep.

Second, in August 2020, it proposed three capitals – an executive capital in Visakhapatnam, a legislative capital in Amaravati, and a judicial capital in Kurnool with the Andhra Pradesh Decentralisation and Inclusive Development of All Regions Act of 2020.  However, AP government withdrew this with the AP Capital Region Development Authority Repeal Act, 2020 on 22 November, 2021 with the promise to bring better and more comprehensive legislation after plugging the loopholes in the previous one.

Third, on January 26, 2022, AP government issued a notification declaring its intent to reorganise the existing 13 districts into 26 new districts in the state. The division of employees will be completed in March and new districts’ administration will start from 2 April, 2022.

All three policies appear to promote decentralisation, despite being top-down initiatives of the AP government. We wish to analyse these proposals and examine whether AP government is actually able to implement a decentralised governance structure that would achieve a more inclusive political and economic regime.

What is decentralisation?  Scholars have defined it as the transfer of political, administrative and financial powers by the central/state government to elected governments at the district, sub-district and village levels (Rajasekhar, 2022). An essential component of decentralisation should be participation of people in decision-making, empowerment of the community and democratisation of society. This is because the transfer of powers takes place for the benefit of the community, including and especially the marginalised – women, disadvantaged castes, minorities and those from economically backward regions (Gaurang, 2008). Participation of people in decentralised governance (for instance, taking part in grama sabhas) enables the poor to hold the local government accountable and contribute to improved and efficient service delivery.

Grama/Ward Sachivalayams and RBKs

First, AP government has conceived grama/ward sachivalayams as a parallel system which is independent of, and unaccountable to the elected village panchayat and municipal councils (Government of A.P, 2019 & 2020). This basically goes against the spirit of democratic decentralisation.

Second, 1.25 lakh volunteers and village secretariat assistants working in 15,005 sachivalayams have been appointed to deliver services to the doorstep of citizens in various sectors – education, sanitation, water conservation, women protection, social welfare,  and so forth.   All staff are temporary with a salary of Rs 15,000 per month and are directly accountable to the chief minister’s peshi (a tendency towards centralisation) and not to the local elected bodies.  Local communities now do not have to go around politicians, middlemen, revenue and other government offices for the issue of ID cards, signatures, grievances regarding disbursal of pension money, verification of records, and so forth. However, has this made any substantive difference to the lives of people or potential to contribute towards empowerment of local communities and devolution of powers to the elected local bodies?

Third, RBKs have been creating hurdles rather than facilitating the supply of seeds, fertilisers and pesticides.  Our interaction with a group of small farmers in Anantapur district revealed that RBKs have stocked agricultural inputs of select companies and wanted farmers to buy these products in their respective villages.  Also, local communities are not able to exercise their choice of inputs as the government is promoting products of certain brands and companies with their own vested interests and that small, marginal and tenant farmers could not purchase inputs at RBKs because they are available only on cash payments.  Earlier, local dealers used to provide inputs on credit.

Fourth, the government has signed an agreement with big companies like Reliance, Hindustan Unilever Limited, P&G, ITC, etc in order to strengthen the rural economy and through the YSR cheyutha scheme to promote entrepreneurship among women (The New Indian Express, 2020).  Similarly, Reliance has entered into an agreement with the state government to supply selected provisions through these gram sachivalayams.  Is the government creating pathways for the entry of corporate capital through sachivalayams and a captive clientele for these corporates?

 

Fifth, it is important to ask whether this system of Grama Sachivalayams (that seeks to displace, subsume, replace and weaken elected local bodies) along with the government appointed Volunteers (paid political party extension/outreach workers) is also creating new kinds of “patronage politics” for the ruling party ?

 

AP Capital Issue

AP government justified the move to decentralise AP’s capital in order to provide development of all three regions particularly backward north Andhra and Rayalaseema.  Following are the major issues with it.

First, small and  marginal farmers who parted with their land in the land pooling scheme for the proposed Amaravati mega capital city (during the previous regime under TDP) are left without clarity and direction given all the uncertainty created by the three capital proposal. However, until now, the government has not laid out a clear road map on how the concerns of these farmers, tenants, landless workers, dalits and women workers, who lost their land or livelihoods in the proposed capital region of Amaravati, would be addressed.  Government should have thought through the implications of announcing three capitals before making a policy or at the very least should have initiated a democratic dialogue with the farmers’ groups and political parties in explaining the rationale of three capitals, while finding a viable and amicable solution to the already dispossessed farmers and those that lost their daily livelihoods, instead of handling resistance with repression.

Second, Visakhapatnam city has become a hub for land transfers – sales, encroachments, acquisitions, and mortgage, in the current regime.  The way AP government is aggressively occupying the hills, planning constructions against ecological norms and facilitating land transfers with the justification that Visakhapatnam can become a new growth engine.  A serious question about the way the government is going about developing Visakhapatnam is to ask if all those who missed out on the Amaravati real estate speculation between 2014 and 2019 are creating an alternative pathway to acquiring quick profits.

Third, instead of focusing on employment generating activities and development projects within each region, the current government is focusing on privatising public assets (Gangavaram and Krishnapatnam ports to Adani, Bhogapuram airport to GMR), land deals to benefit the corporates (Divi group to set up Pharma units in Thondangi, Kakinada SEZs to Aurobindo), taking over assigned lands from Dalits in the name of housing for the poor,  implementing electricity,  property tax and urban reform, all reflecting  the current government’s lopsided development policies.

New Districts

Recently, the government proposed to expand the number of districts for better governance and decentralisation. While this could be an effective way of taking governance to the people, ensuring administrative convenience to backward regions and facilitating development programmes to marginalised groups, there are serious questions over the way these new districts are being carved out.

 

First, the very basis for reorganising the districts with parliamentary constituencies as the organizing criterion is flawed.  The state level committee constituted by the government should have engaged in wider public consultations to evolve parameters for reorganising districts by taking into account geographical, socio-cultural factors, natural resources, irrigation facilities, historical significance of each region to ensure a more equal sharing of resources for every district.

 

Second, while the new district headquarters should have been determined by giving preference to the development of backward regions and with the idea of improving geographical proximity to all. The chosen process would result in several places across the state either remaining at considerable distance from the proposed district headquarters or in some cases, facing increased distance.  Thus, agitations are currently going on as several regions are in conflict with one other, over the proposed district headquarters.

 

Third, the government has not considered the need to preserve the sovereignty given to the tribal village councils in accordance with the Constitution under Panchayats (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996 (PESA), and the Forest Rights Act.  Hence, Adivasis are apprehensive that the formation of new districts could dilute their rights and also threaten their autonomy.  In order to prevent non-tribal business and real estate interests making way into tribal districts like in Telangana with the reorganisation of districts, A.P government should make Integrated Tribal Development Agency (ITDA) headquarters into a new district.

 

Fourth, the creation of new districts is also likely to spur a fresh cycle of land acquisition for building new infrastructure, for housing the collectorate and other government departments which would activate land market for speculative gains.  This in turn will lead to encroachment of assigned lands, commons and land belonging to marginalised groups.

 

Conclusion   

 

To sum up, to draw from a different context, the Kerala model of village panchayats is a convergence model where one sees integration of democratic bodies in compliance with 73 and 74 Amendments of the Indian constitution and has a significant bottom-up imperative.

On the other hand, the AP model bypasses the existing democratic structures.  AP  government has prioritised “direct cash transfers” on the one hand, while pursuing a neoliberal growth model on the other by opening new pathways to private capital, monetising public assets, taking over assigned lands, Jagananna smart townships and so forth. This raises a question of whether AP’s model will perpetuate existing disparities and generate new spatial and economic inequalities with the rhetoric of decentralisation?

In our view, democratic and inclusive decentralisation is certainly possible and desirable. This can be achieved by establishing regional development boards that could carefully devise  appropriate sustainable development models that speak to the different eco-types, climate and soil conditions, and urban strengths, while making policies in a democratic, bottom-up way. This would also generate more employment opportunities in rural and urban areas.  Grama/ward sachivalayams should be made accountable to the  local elected bodies and the recruitment, supervision and control of sachivalayam staff should be in the hands of elected bodies. Grama sachivalayam Volunteers, Assistants, ASHA workers, Anganwadi workers and other outsourced and contract staff in different government departments need to be regularised in order to strengthen decentralisation process.  Similarly, the modified AP decentralized capital plan or the redistricting process should take a lot of inputs from different people’s organizations and grassroots initiatives, and proceed very carefully forward. Instead of implementing top-down decentralisation policies that may benefit corporate players, real estate interests,  and political profit seekers, AP government’s decentralisation ought to bring about a people-centric system of governance in furthering the democratic aspirations of different classes, castes, genders, religions, and indigenous groups in Andhra Pradesh.

References

Government of Andhra Pradesh (2019 & 2020).  GO Ms No. 33 and GO Ms No.156. Abstract.  Chief Secretary to Government of Andhra Pradesh.

https://gramawardsachivalayam.ap.gov.in/GSWS/AdsandGos/assets/go/30_GO_Ms_33_2020_GAD.pdf

https://gramawardsachivalayam.ap.gov.in/GSWS/AdsandGos/assets/go/36_GO_Ms._40-GAD-SO_ASO_allotment.pdf

Rajasekhar D (ed) (2022).  Handbook of Decentralised Governance and Development in India. Routledge.

Gaurang, Sahay (2008).  Decentralisation, Panchayati Raj and the Rights of Marginalised Groups in India: A Case for Civil Society. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/263220910_Decentralisation_Panchayati_Raj_and_the_Rights_of_Marginalised_Groups_in_India_A_Case_for_Civil_Society

The New Indian Express (2020).  Andhra Pradesh Government Signs MoUs for Women’s Empowerment. 4 August.
https://www.newindianexpress.com/states/andhra-pradesh/2020/aug/04/andhra-pradesh-government-signs-mous-for-womens-empowerment-2178860.html.